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1Summary
Russia’s approach to the European Union (EU) has changed fundamentally 
over the last few years. The Kremlin is no longer drawing gradually closer to 
crisis-stricken Europe. Instead, Russia is entering a period of  domestic uncer-
tainty and rebalancing its foreign policy to emphasize its Eurasian neighbors 
and China. Europe should take note. In order to develop an effective strategic 
approach toward their biggest neighbor, Europeans must deepen their under-
standing of  the changing realities in Russia.
The Russian Landscape
•	 For	the	first	time	since	the	late	Soviet	era,	Russians	are	becoming	inter-
ested in public affairs. This Russian awakening covers the entire societal 
spectrum, from libertarians to Orthodox fundamentalists.
•	 Russians are becoming more politically active and want more account-
ability and respect from their rulers.
•	 The	government	finds	 it	hard	to	meet	the	challenge	of	ensuring	robust	
economic growth and development and is unwilling to begin transition-
ing from authoritarianism to a political system based on the rule of law.
•	 Confronted with domestic challenges, the regime has become more insu-
lar and isolationist, seeking to solidify its base.
•	 The leadership has managed to stabilize its position, and opposition groups 
are in disarray. A “social explosion” is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
•	 The Kremlin’s political relations with the EU have become appreciably 
cooler. Moscow no longer sees Europe—and its value system in particu-
lar—as a model. 
•	 Russia	 is,	 and	 will	 continue	 to	 be,	 for	 the	 Russians	 themselves	 to	 fix.	
Outsiders	can	 influence	Russian	developments	only	at	 the	margins	and	
not always positively. 
What the EU Can Do
Focus on its own long-term strategic priorities. The EU’s policies should 
not center on what the Europeans want Russia to be or become. Instead, 
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Brussels needs to work with Moscow on the EU’s own wants and needs. 
Those priorities include ensuring peace and stability in Europe, expanding 
and deepening trade with Russia, avoiding overdependence on Russian energy 
supplies, and exploiting investment opportunities in the country.
Deepen engagement with Russians at all levels and in all fields. Even 
though outside powers cannot dictate change in Russia, expanding engage-
ment on the economy, business, cultural activities, tourism, exchange pro-
grams, and more will substantially contribute to the transformation of Russian 
society. And this will create a better environment for the EU in the east. 
Phase out visa restrictions that apply to ordinary Russian citizens. 
Opening Europe to Russians can effectively counter the Kremlin’s isolation-
ist trends. Moving toward a visa-free regime is the most effective way for the 
EU to use its soft power with respect to Russia. 
3The shifting eU-russia relationship
The relationship between the European Union and Russia is undergoing a 
subtle but immensely important change that is centered, in large part, on the 
changing Russian landscape. Russia is no longer gradually “Europeanizing” 
and drawing closer to the EU. Instead, it is entering a period of domestic 
uncertainty, and the Kremlin is rebalancing the country’s foreign policy to 
emphasize Russia’s Eurasian neighbors and China. 
Economic uncertainty, meanwhile, is playing a part as well, and experts 
offered several scenarios for Russia’s future, none too rosy, at the 2013 World 
Economic Forum in Davos. One foresaw a plunge in the price of oil with dire 
consequences for the budget and social stability of Russia, which is in many ways 
dependent on its energy exports. Another suggested that even if oil prices stayed 
sufficiently high, public discontent would grow because the Russian people are 
increasingly tired of corruption and the lack of official accountability. 
Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin used those scenarios to send a clear 
message from the Davos forum: rather than seeking to benefit from the global 
economic recovery, which has proven too sluggish, and high oil prices, which 
have proven too uncertain, Russia needs to embrace institutional reforms and 
work to substantially improve its investment climate. 
Kudrin has a point. The country desperately needs to reform a number of 
its institutions, including pensions, public services, police, and the judiciary, 
and a better investment climate would certainly help relaunch the flagging 
Russian economy. But political and social developments will play an equally 
important role in shaping the country’s evolution, directly influencing its eco-
nomic prospects. 
Recently, the Russian social environment has fundamentally and irrevers-
ibly changed. Two decades of post-Communist adjustment have produced a 
new feature: an interest in public affairs on the part of a growing (but still 
minority) section of society.1 This development is nothing like the Arab 
Spring, which is also sometimes referred to as an Arab Awakening. It is nei-
ther an anti-Putin revolution nor a prologue to one. Rather, it represents a 
society that has begun to emerge from its post-Soviet hibernation, when the 
focus was almost exclusively on surviving physically and winning and arrang-
ing one’s private space. The Russian people have overwhelmingly weathered 
the harsh transition, and many have managed to become relatively affluent. 
Yet, the more interesting—and difficult—part still lies ahead. Russia faces 
the challenge of ensuring robust economic growth and development while 
simultaneously transitioning from arbitrary rule and authoritarianism to a 
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political system based on the rule of law. Given the size and immense diver-
sity of the country, it will be crucial that this momentous transformation does 
not provoke chaos and civil strife. Russians will have to find a way to agree on 
the fundamentals, even as they learn to embrace their own diversity and the 
multiplicity of their interests. Russia also needs to find an adequate position 
for itself in the global economy and strike the right balance in its relations with 
key international actors, including the United States, China, and Europe.
It is quite possible that EU-Russia relations will become largely transac-
tional and laden with controversies over domestic politics and divergent val-
ues. Yet, Europe and Russia continue to matter to each other in many ways. 
Russia is the EU’s largest supplier of natural gas and oil, for instance. And 
beyond the energy trade, peace and security on the Continent, regional stabil-
ity, economic development, and humanitarian and cultural ties demand pro-
ductive EU-Russian interaction. 
The EU remains an interested and very close observer 
of these Russian developments. Even though relations 
with Moscow have lost some of the vital importance they 
carried during the Cold War, internal processes in Russia 
will affect the livelihoods of many Europeans, and not 
only those in states sharing a border with Russia.
It is time, then, that Europeans looked beyond the headlines and into the 
very complex mix of issues comprising Russia’s medium- and long-term agen-
das. In order to build a strategic approach toward their biggest neighbor that 
works, the Europeans need to be keen observers and good listeners. The EU 
must deepen its understanding of the changing realities in Russia.
an Uneasy Calm
Russia recently went through a period of significant domestic upheaval, but 
the Russian authorities believe that, for now, they have safely weathered the 
recent storm of public discontent. Mass protests sparked by fraudulent elec-
tions in late 2011 peaked in early 2012 and tapered off after the May 2012 
presidential inauguration. Civic activism, unstructured and essentially leader-
less, has not morphed into mass political opposition, and the figureheads of 
the movement have failed to build a broad support base. Once the election-
fraud theme became dated, the protesting crowds dwindled.
The government opted for repressive measures against several leaders of 
these demonstrations. The activist blogger Alexei Navalny has been put on 
trial, ostensibly for economic crimes. Sergey Udaltsov, the firebrand leader of 
the radical Left Front, has been placed under house arrest. A number of rank-
and-file protesters were jailed following clashes with police in May 2012. Blogs 
and social-network exchanges, which once constituted a powerful medium for 
organizing mass action, have turned into little more than safety valves. Those 
The eU must deepen its understanding 
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who are no longer willing to venture into the street can freely and safely vent 
their frustration on Facebook or its Russian equivalents. 
The Russian government has carefully avoided overreaction. The regime 
has palpably toughened but has not degenerated into an outright dictatorship. 
Broad popular acquiescence remains the bedrock of the authoritarian regime, 
which stays in power not so much by force as by the consent of the majority of 
the governed. Its repressive measures were in fact carefully targeted, affecting 
a handful—dozens, at most hundreds—of people. So far, these measures have 
apparently worked as an effective deterrent.
The State Duma, despite the somewhat significant representation of two 
nominal opposition parties, the Communists and the Just Russia Party, has 
come under the Kremlin’s control. Both opposition parties have overwhelm-
ingly sided with the ruling United Russia Party and its allies in Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party in promulgating repressive legislation. 
The Federation Council, the parliament’s upper chamber, has demonstrated 
extreme loyalty to Vladimir Putin. United Russia won all five gubernatorial 
elections held in 2012, which had been reinstituted—with important restric-
tions—after an eight-year ban that had provoked much criticism in Russia and 
the West was lifted. 
In an even more spectacular feat, the Kremlin has been able to tighten its 
control over Russian elites under the slogan of “nationalizing” them. Loyalty to 
the Kremlin no longer guarantees immunity from prosecution. Several senior 
bureaucrats have been charged with corruption, apparently in response to the 
opposition’s condemnation of “crooks and thieves” in power. All senior offi-
cials have been barred by law from owning assets (excluding real estate) abroad. 
Ironically, this may be seen as Putin’s reply to the 2012 Magnitsky Act 
passed by the U.S. Congress, which imposed sanctions on Russian officials 
suspected of involvement in the death of imprisoned corporate lawyer Sergei 
Magnitsky. But whereas the Magnitsky Act sanctioned only a handful of mis-
behaving officials, Putin’s move applies to all. The Kremlin is convinced that 
if Russian officials keep their money abroad, they become vulnerable to poten-
tial pressure from foreign governments. Putin prefers that these officials repa-
triate their money, placing it out of reach of foreigners, but well within the 
reach of the Kremlin. 
The Kremlin has also made use of the terms of the recent EU bailout of 
Cyprus to enhance its message. Under the terms of the deal, Cypriots were 
required to raise billions of euros in exchange for bailout funds, most of which 
are likely to come from a tax on investors with large deposits in Cypriot banks. 
Many of those investors are Russian. The Kremlin harshly criticized the “con-
fiscation” of depositors’ money in those banks and ultimately turned the epi-
sode into an argument in favor of bringing private Russian money back to 
Russia. Alas, until the country’s domestic legal climate significantly improves, 
this argument will not carry much weight with wealthier Russian citizens. 
6 | The End of an Era in EU-Russia Relations
The Kremlin’s efforts to quell unrest at the political and elite level are 
helped along by a growing contentment among the general populace on the 
economic front. Most Russians seem relatively satisfied with their current lots 
in life. According to Russian pollsters, Russian citizens report the highest-ever 
degree of satisfaction with their material situation. Almost three-quarters of 
Russians consider their material condition to be fair, 12 percent feel good, 
and only 16 percent are unhappy about it. There is also more optimism than 
pessimism and despair, and the expectations of future improvement in living 
standards are quite high. The Levada Center, an independent polling organi-
zation, notes that more people are planning for their future. 
Economic growth has decelerated significantly over the past year, but the 
government has so far managed to deliver on its social obligations. Russia’s 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is now $18,570 in purchasing power 
parity terms, or just about 15 percent lower than Poland’s, roughly equal to 
Croatia’s, and 30 percent above Turkey’s. Despite the slower growth, real 
incomes are rising. Unemployment, officially at 5 percent, is perfectly tol-
erable. Inflation, currently at 7.1 percent, appears manageable for the time 
being, although many economists are alarmed. The demographic decline has 
slowed, at least for now, and Russian life expectancy has risen to seventy years. 
Although many international experts are still skeptical, the Russian govern-
ment now hopes to see the country’s population rise to 150 million between 
2020 and 2025, up from 143 million in 2012 and far above international pro-
jections from several years ago. 
A “social explosion”—which some opposition figures hoped for a year 
ago—is thus unlikely to happen anytime soon unless these economic circum-
stances drastically change.
If the Kremlin, however, becomes complacent, it may be in for a bad sur-
prise. The dipping of the benchmark oil price to below $100 per barrel in April 
2013 was one warning. The very real prospect of economic recession—or at 
least stagnation—in the fall of 2013 is another. As a result, 
social discontent may resurface. The Russian law-enforce-
ment apparatus is sufficient to neutralize the more active 
protesters, but it can do little about the steadily changing 
popular attitudes toward the way the country is run. 
In the past, the Russian people were most concerned 
about their private lives. Now, their demands have 
changed. Higher incomes and more goods to buy are no 
longer sufficient. People who can afford to purchase more 
goods of a higher quality now want better living condi-
tions as well. Housing has become a major and increasingly acute problem—
and one that cannot be resolved quickly. People also desire a healthcare system 
that is universal, professional, and affordable. The same holds true for the 
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education system. The lack of national cohesion and the persistence of inter-
ethnic, interconfessional tensions have emerged as key issues as well. 
Meanwhile, Russians expect more accountability and respect from those 
who rule in their name. Small- and medium-sized businesses reel under the 
crunch of official corruption. In 2012, 400,000 such businesses had to close, 
unable to pay higher taxes that were levied as a result of the government’s 
determination to find money to compensate for rising pensions. To many, the 
Kremlin’s recent token fight against corruption looks more like a cover-up. 
Cabinet-level figures who have been implicated in criminal investigations as 
part of the anticorruption push are likely to be spared a trial, and their subor-
dinates are likely to bear the brunt of the accusations. 
In reality, the Russian elite continues to rule and largely own the country 
with the ordinary people’s acquiescence. Yet, sociopolitical issues are becom-
ing as pronounced in the public debate as the socioeco-
nomic ones. Increasing numbers of Russians are looking 
for a government that is more efficient and less corrupt. 
And this yearning for change is not wholly confined to 
the larger metropolitan centers. It has slowly but steadily 
expanded to some of the bigger industrial cities and the 
frontier regions in the country’s east and west. 
And the steady maturing of society presents the long-term possibility of 
change from below. Indeed, relatively slow but fundamental shifts within 
society itself are determining the direction in which Russia is headed. 
society still stirs
Despite the uneasy calm that has settled over Russia, thanks to the Kremlin’s 
response to unrest and the soothing effects of economic improvement, unrest 
still bubbles beneath the surface. From nationalism to Islamism to liberalism, 
many members of society remain eager for change.
Political change, when it comes, may be abrupt or more gradual, depending 
on the circumstances. Social change, by contrast, is almost always steady and 
organic. Much of it is generational. Now, for the first time since perestroika, 
there is a lively debate happening within parts of Russian society itself rather 
than between a group of self-appointed “friends of the people” (or intelli-
gentsia) and the supreme authority, as in czarist and Soviet times. There are 
instances of social innovation, such as volunteer movements that, to a casual 
observer, appear to arise from nowhere even though they have been in gesta-
tion for years. 
In fact, this new constituency of post-Soviet Russians that has emerged 
is full of achievers, people who make their own choices and decisions. Many 
of them have good professional skills, well-paying jobs, and comfortable 
lifestyles. Gradually, this community has developed an interest in volunteer 
relatively slow but fundamental shifts 
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activism, such as charitable or environmental activities, and gained experi-
ence with collective action and civic organization. “Activists,” according to a 
Moscow journalist who is herself an activist, “do not demand, they do.” This 
is a clear change in mentality.
And that action can take any number of forms. The awakening occurring 
in Russia covers the entire societal spectrum, from Pussy Riot libertarians 
to Orthodox fundamentalists, from gay activists to Cossacks with their very 
traditional views not just on the family but also on contemporary art and 
what constitutes public order. Society is rediscovering diversity at all levels, 
including regional ones. With this diversity comes conflict in its own midst. 
“The people” are no longer united against “the authorities” but fight among 
themselves as well.
The intelligentsia, previously the figureheads of sociopolitical movements, 
are still trying to press the “demands of the people” on the authorities, but their 
mediation is less desirable than it was before. More and more people are find-
ing a voice of their own. Those who call themselves members of the “creative 
class” are both vocal and independent in formulating their views. Economic, 
regional, professional, and other special interests are becoming more pro-
nounced and more direct. Inevitably, they compete among themselves. 
But Russia’s new social movement remains essentially leaderless at this 
stage. The bloggers, writers, journalists, and cultural figures at the forefront 
of the debate have not become political leaders. Some aspiring opinion leaders 
have proven to be ignorant of key details of important public issues or poorly 
versed in the intricacies of economic or foreign policy. 
Much of today’s debate revolves around the issues that affect the majority 
of the population, such as reforming school tests and the higher education 
system, improving the quality and affordability of healthcare, and rectifying 
the dire situation of housing and communal services. 
All this activity is pointed in different directions at the same time. 
Sociologists talk about three, even four, Russias existing side by side. There 
is one Russia comprosed of the largely modernized metropolitan centers with 
elements of postindustrial economy, like Moscow and St. Petersburg, and, at 
a considerable distance, the modernizing large cities of 1 million residents or 
more. Taken together, these include about 20 percent of the country’s pop-
ulation. There is another Russia that contains the very slowly modernizing 
industrial areas (25–30 percent of the population) and a third with the small 
towns and the countryside, which has little or no capacity for modernization 
(40 percent of the population). A fourth Russia includes the remaining 5 to 10 
percent of the population that lives in traditionalist regions, mainly in parts 
of southern Siberia and the North Caucasus, and is sometimes referred to by 
Russian scholars as the country’s “internal abroad.” 
In response to these increasing divisions, Russian authorities, who had long 
pretended to be all things to all people, have moved to the right to frankly 
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embrace social conservatism, which resonates with some 60 percent of the 
voters, most of whom are in small-town and rural Russia. 
The Kremlin, until now proudly pragmatic, has come up with its own rather 
vague version of Russian patriotism, which its critics liken to the Orthodoxy-
autocracy-nationalism formula coined in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In this, the Russian Orthodox Church has emerged for the first time in 
post-Communist times as an open political ally of the Kremlin. This rela-
tionship is now officially termed a partnership. The authorities hope that the 
church’s blessing will shore up their legitimacy, which was questioned during 
the recent protests. However, a small liberal and proto-reformist trend has 
developed within the church itself that could introduce a measure of dissent 
into church life.
As the Orthodox Church takes on a higher public profile, the Islamization 
of Russia—even outside the traditionally Muslim-majority regions—is 
spreading. More young Muslims, including in those places such as the Urals 
and western Siberia, are becoming active supporters of political Islam. This 
is a new and still poorly understood phenomenon. The Arab Spring, which 
Russian Muslims interpreted as a symbol of political Islam’s success, contrib-
uted to the emergence of Islamist radicalism as an element in Russia’s political 
panorama. The North Caucasus and Tatarstan have seen demonstrations in 
support of the Syrian opposition, and a body of opinion has formed within 
Russia’s Muslim community that advocates advancing Russian interests by 
reaching out to ruling Islamists in various parts of the Arab world.
These developments are occurring as many well-established Russian polit-
ical factions find themselves facing serious challenges. Liberals are on the 
defensive and bitterly bickering among themselves. Radicals are accusing the 
moderates who cooperate with the authorities of treason. Hardcore nation-
alists have been making arguments that carry weight with the ruling elite, 
although not always with society as a whole. Left-leaning populism remains 
strong, even if the existing political formations, from the Communists to the 
Just Russia Party to the Left Front, have failed to effectively accommodate it. 
And as Russian society continues to grow and expand, the current regime, 
based as it is on personal power, is becoming more insular. Rather than reach-
ing out to society, it seeks to solidify its base. 
implications for russia’s Political future
These slow but comprehensive changes in society will impact the country’s 
future political situation. Barring some unforeseen developments and emer-
gencies, it is safe to suggest that the next spikes in political activism will prob-
ably be tied to new elections. 
National elections are still a long way off. The Duma’s present mandate runs 
out in late 2016, and Putin’s current presidential term expires in the spring of 
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2018. Regional and local elections are now held once a year in the fall, and the 
most interesting event of the 2013 cycle is perhaps the gubernatorial election 
in the Moscow region (which excludes the city of Moscow). Politics will gather 
speed beginning in 2014, when the Moscow City Duma will be elected. 
It is too early to speculate about President Putin’s chances for reelection 
in 2018. He looks determined to run again, but 40 percent of respondents in 
January 2013 said they would want to elect someone other than Putin in 2018. 
While still capable of generating reasonably high electoral support (three times 
as many people believe his record so far has been rather positive than rather 
negative), Putin clearly fails to inspire. His approval rating has sunk apprecia-
bly, and he has now become a more divisive than uniting figure. And given 
everything that has happened since Putin’s fateful September 2011 announce-
ment that he would run again for the presidency, few take Dmitry Medvedev 
seriously as an independent political figure either.
Should Putin’s popularity continue to slip, the ruling elite would need to 
look for a replacement. Forty-seven percent of Russians believe the Kremlin 
might come up with a fresh candidate. Some mention Moscow Mayor Sergei 
Sobyanin, while others cite Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin or Minister 
of Defense Sergei Shoigu. All this, of course, is highly hypothetical at the pres-
ent stage. But should such a change at the top become a reality, it will have 
important implications for Moscow’s foreign policy, which—in post-Soviet 
as well as in Soviet times—has been the prerogative of the de facto monarch.
Kremlin foreign Policy 
In February 2013, the Kremlin officially unveiled a new foreign policy con-
cept for Russia. This is not a new phenomenon. During each presidential term 
since 2000, Vladimir Putin has had a new foreign policy doctrine—and in 
more than name only. In the early 2000s, this was an alliance with the United 
States, coupled with the “European choice.” In the mid-2000s, this gave way 
to a policy of defensive self-assertion, manifested in the 2007 Munich speech 
in which Putin lashed out at the George W. Bush administration’s preference 
for taking international law into its own hands. Medvedev’s presidency, which 
was in practice Putin’s third term, was marked by a reset with Washington 
and a search for “modernization resources” in the West that was designed to 
facilitate the flow of investment and advanced technology to Russia. Putin’s 
formal return to the Kremlin has ushered in yet another iteration of his for-
eign policy, which might be called “sovereignization.” 
Above all else, Putin has moved to consolidate power at home. He saw those 
who protested in Russian cities during the winter of 2011–2012 as being pawns 
of the U.S. State Department—which did indeed finance some civil-society 
and democracy-building programs but did not fund the protests. In response, 
Putin ordered the cancellation of U.S. Agency for International Development 
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activities in Russia and the legal branding of Russian nongovernmental organi-
zations accepting funding from abroad as “foreign agents.” The Kremlin went 
even further when, in response to the U.S. Magnitsky Act, it ended the practice 
of American adoption of Russian orphans. 
Evidently, Putin wants to do more than abolish the 
post–Cold War vestiges of Russia’s unequal status vis-
à-vis the West—its position as a foreign aid recipient, a 
democracy-class dropout, a country from which outsiders 
rescue orphans. He also seeks to reduce the exposure of 
Russian officials to potential pressure from the outside, 
likely in hopes that doing so will ensure that these offi-
cials are more completely subject to the Kremlin’s control. 
Indeed, control is Putin’s true objective. Sovereignty is his slogan, and nation-
alism is the soul of his policy.
eurasian integration
Putin’s main foreign policy project is Eurasian integration. The customs union 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, which has been in operation since 2009, is 
in the process of being upgraded into a single economic space, with the goal of 
an economic union among the three by 2015. Moscow is determined to make 
full use of incentives, such as the opening of its huge labor market, to attract 
greater integration on the part of Russia’s neighbors. By contrast, those who 
choose to stay away will find themselves largely shut out. Citizens of these 
countries will lose the privilege to freely move to and work in Russia in 2015. 
Economic integration, which creates a common market and allows for freer 
migration of labor, makes sense for each of the three countries. For Russia, 
however, its scale is rather modest—in 2012, Belarus’s share of Russian for-
eign trade was a mere 4.3 percent, and Kazakhstan’s was just above 2 percent. 
President Putin wants economic integration to pave the way to a more com-
prehensive consolidation of the Eurasian space, to include security and supra-
national institutions. But his partners in Astana and Minsk are more cautious. 
Even though Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev regularly reminds 
everyone that he was the original author of the Eurasian Union concept, which 
he laid out in a 1994 speech at Moscow University, the Kazakhs only want 
economic integration and balk at proposals for creating common institutions. 
Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenka has used the idea of Eurasian 
integration much as he has used the notional “union state”—supposedly exist-
ing between Belarus and Russia since 1999—as a means of getting economic 
benefits from Moscow in exchange for pledges of geopolitical loyalty. 
President Putin has been personally working hard to expand the integra-
tion effort to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This will be difficult. Even 
though the Kyrgyz badly want to keep their access to the Russian market and 
Control is Putin’s true objective. 
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Moscow’s economic assistance, the idea of a union with Russia is controversial 
among those who want to keep more room for geopolitical maneuver. 
Tajikistan has long been practicing a multivector foreign policy. Prioritizing 
ties with Russia is not Dushanbe’s intention, despite the fact that some 50 
percent of the country’s GDP is currently made up of remittances sent by 
Tajiks working in Russia. The Tajiks want to keep their freedom of maneuver 
by reaching out simultaneously to Iran, India, the United States, and China. In 
addition, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are far behind Kazakhstan economically, 
and their accession would slow the pace of Eurasian integration and be a drain 
on Russia’s resources.
Putin has offered membership in the customs union to Ukraine, which is 
torn between the appeal of short-term gains in the East, such as lower gas prices, 
and its long-term aspirations to join the West. Essentially, Kiev has continued 
its old game of trying to get the most from relations with both of its big neigh-
bors—the EU and Russia—without making a clear and unambiguous choice. 
Putin’s offer, however, is coupled with a warning that Ukraine cannot main-
tain privileged access to the customs union’s market, such as the low tariffs it 
currently enjoys on a number of its exports to Russia, if Kiev does not join. 
Yet, it can be argued that Russian national interests would be better served by 
having Ukraine outside the tent of Eurasian integration than in it.  Ukraine, 
a much poorer country than Russia today, would require much assistance and 
that, as a nation much bigger than Kazakhstan or Belarus, it would demand 
too much of a voice. Even if it were to get both, according to these critics, it 
would never stop looking to the West. Putin, however, is 
apparently unconvinced, motivated largely by geopolitical 
reasons. 
Moscow has also been cultivating Tashkent, hoping to 
engage Uzbekistan, and Chisinau, promising to work for 
the unity of Moldova. All of this is certainly not the begin-
ning of a new Soviet Union, and a degree of integration 
between Russia and some of its neighbors makes sense in economic terms. 
The Eurasian Union will be successful as long as it manages to stay economic 
and voluntary. 
But Putin clearly seeks to enhance Russia’s geopolitical standing in relation 
to its two biggest neighbors in Eurasia: the European Union to the west and 
China to the east. This is a far cry from Moscow’s policies of the early 2000s, 
which prioritized Russia’s integration into the European Union.
russia and the West
In the past ten years or so, the Kremlin’s approach to the EU has changed 
fundamentally. It no longer regards Europe as a mentor or even a model. 
Russia no longer seeks a relationship in which the two partners would have, 
in Romano Prodi’s memorable phrase, “everything in common except the 
The eurasian Union will be successful as long 
as it manages to stay economic and voluntary. 
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institutions.” The four common areas agreed upon in 2005 as fields of inte-
gration—economic; freedom, security, and justice; external security; and 
research, education, and culture—are by now history. Instead, the relationship 
is becoming more transactional, symbolized more by adding new pipelines 
and bickering over visas than by the profession of common values, not to 
speak of their implementation. 
Indeed, Moscow has not only accepted the values gap between itself and 
the EU but has begun to proudly advertise its own more conservative val-
ues, such as national sovereignty, religious faith, and traditional family. These 
priorities stand in contrast to Europe’s unchecked freedoms which, in the 
Kremlin’s view, erode society and will eventually doom it. 
In the foreseeable future, Moscow is unlikely to emerge as a security risk 
to Europe, either because of its domestic developments or its foreign policy. 
The country will neither implode nor explode, and a Russian invasion of EU 
territory can be safely ruled out. 
Russia’s 2012 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
not led to an intensification of EU-Russian economic relations. To the con-
trary, Europeans are bringing up complaints about Russian actions. But the 
eighteen-year-long WTO negotiation process must have indicated to the EU 
that Russia was more interested in protecting what it had than in using the 
accession as a “big bang” to liberalize and modernize its economy, as others, 
including China, have done. Moreover, some sectors of the Russian economy 
will need time to adjust to the new, more competitive environment of life in 
the WTO. As a result, moving forward on free trade with the EU may not be 
easy or quick. 
A more productive way to proceed now would be to improve the bottle-
necks that hamper EU-Russian economic relations. Another relevant issue is 
how to factor in the emerging Eurasian economic union—one of whose mem-
bers, Kazakhstan, may be joining the WTO reasonably soon, while another, 
Belarus, is nowhere close to accession. 
In the field of energy, mutual dependence between the EU and Russia will 
persist even as the recent shale gas revolution in the United States and the 
changes in the international gas trade have caused Russia’s share of the EU 
energy market to diminish. The energy dialogue has been unproductive, with 
each side ignoring the other’s unilateral bids. Russia appears monopolistic and 
heavy-handed to the EU, and the EU seems overly bureaucratic and unyield-
ing to Russians. Moscow has preferred to counter the EU’s internal regula-
tions with its own ultimatums. 
The Kremlin continues to be obsessed with building pipelines, driven 
by the strategic decision to put an end to problems with gas transit across 
Ukraine. This strategy has a high price: there is a significant amount of pipe-
line redundancy, with half the capacity going unused. Moreover, the EU is 
poised to connect national gas pipeline segments within its territory so it can 
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provide for flexible gas transfers among its member states. Once that project 
comes to fruition, it will be able to markedly reduce its dependence on Russian 
gas giant Gazprom’s pricing policy. 
President Putin has also moved to re-reset relations with the United 
States. He initially set aside politico-military issues, including arms control, 
which featured prominently in the Medvedev interlude. Putin’s own prior-
ity is expanding trade with Americans on the model of the 2011 Rosneft-
ExxonMobil deal. Over the years, the Russian president has come to prefer 
the company of Western businessmen to that of Western politicians. In the 
two meetings scheduled with U.S. President Barack Obama this year, in June 
at the G8 in Northern Ireland and in September at the G20 in St. Petersburg, 
Vladimir Putin hopes to renew the relationship with the United States on a 
basis of shared interests. 
But there is no doubt that the Kremlin is carving out its own territory. 
Having stopped pretending that Russia is affiliated, however loosely and 
indirectly, with the West, Putin now feels free to take a more robust posture 
internationally. In a highly symbolic gesture, Putin missed back-to-back meet-
ings in 2012—the G8 meeting at Camp David and the NATO Summit in 
Chicago—something no other world leader had done before. 
The crisis in Syria has given Moscow an opportunity to demonstrate its new 
posture. Russia did not like U.S.-led military interventions before, whether in 
the Balkans in the 1990s or in Iraq in the 2000s. It acquiesced in Libya in 2011, 
hoping to strengthen what Dmitry Medvedev then called “modernization alli-
ances” with the West, but was bitterly disappointed when the imposition of a 
no-fly zone morphed into a regime-change operation. In Syria, Moscow has 
stood firm, giving no pretext for intervention to those who want to push or 
ease Syrian President Bashar al-Assad out of power. Russia has also continued 
to give Damascus military aid, material assistance, and moral support. In its 
view, an Islamist takeover of Syria had to be prevented by all means available 
except direct intervention. This has apparently paid off. Two years into the 
Syrian uprising, Assad is still holding out, and Washington is now negotiating 
the future of Syria directly with Moscow—something that has not been seen 
since the end of the Cold War.2 The EU and its key member states, by con-
trast, have not been able to play a significant role in the Syrian crisis. This has 
reduced the EU-Russia dialogue on Syria to general consultations. 
Putin’s Pivot
Putin has also “pivoted” to the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit in Vladivostok in September 2012 was the most visible, 
but not the only, sign of the geopolitical rebalancing now taking place in the 
Kremlin. Moscow understands the secular importance of the rise of Asia, and 
of China in particular, and is seeking to find ways to develop its eastern prov-
inces, which otherwise risk tilting economically toward the great neighbor 
Dmitri Trenin, Maria Lipman, and Alexey Malashenko | 15
across the river. The Russians were obviously gratified to see Chinese President 
Xi Jinping make his first foreign trip to Russia since taking office, and they 
used the opportunity to conclude a number of economic accords with China.
And, while taking great care to maintain good relations with Beijing and 
expand energy trade with China, Moscow is also reaching out to others in the 
region—from Tokyo and Seoul to Delhi and Hanoi—to increase trade and 
investment and develop political contacts. The Japanese prime minister went 
to Moscow within a month of Xi’s visit and was followed a few weeks later 
by the Vietnamese premier. At some point, driven by the same logic, Russia 
may even discover the value of trans-Pacific ties with North America. There 
already seem to be small moves in that direction. During 
the spike in tensions provoked by North Korea in April 
2013, Russia joined the other G8 powers in strongly con-
demning Pyongyang’s moves. 
In Asia, as in Europe, Moscow seeks to capitalize on 
its energy resources. Diversifying Russian energy trade 
toward the Asia-Pacific region, which is already under way 
on a modest scale, is based on a strategic geopolitical and 
geoeconomic rationale rather than a purely economic one. 
To win a new export market for its gas, Russia will have to de facto subsidize 
China’s energy imports. Thus, just as the EU is trying to reduce its dependence 
on the supply of Russian energy, Moscow is seeking to balance the established 
European market with a new and growing Asian one.
The eU’s options regarding russia
For the rest of the world, dealing with Russia in the next few years will mean 
dealing directly with Vladimir Putin, and it will not be easy. Many members of 
European publics find working with Putin detestable because of his authori-
tarian tendencies and will seek to change the existing pattern of relations, 
which, in their view, favors the Kremlin. There are calls for actively opposing 
Moscow’s authoritarianism and dire warnings against any return to realpoli-
tik. Following the U.S. congressional example, some Europeans are calling for 
passing Europe’s own version of the Magnitsky Act to put real pressure on the 
people who rule Russia and their allies. 
Yet, taking up Russian domestic political issues, or simply ignoring Russia 
because of its disagreement with Western policies, will carry its own price. 
Russia is, and will continue to be, for the Russians themselves to fix. Moscow 
is not part of the EU’s Brussels-leaning neighborhood, where conditionality 
can be effectively employed. Outsiders can influence Russian developments 
only on the margins—and not always positively. Western values need to 
inform Western interests, not replace them. 
Just as the eU is trying to reduce its dependence 
on the supply of russian energy, Moscow is 
seeking to balance the established european 
market with a new and growing asian one.
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Europeans need to approach the Russians on European terms while remain-
ing fully aware that Russians have their own interests, values, and terms of ref-
erence. The issue for the EU is not what the Europeans want Russia to be or to 
become—which is different from the EU’s approach to Turkey and Ukraine, 
which are seeking EU membership. Instead, Europeans should think about 
what they want or need from Russia and work on those issues.
Ensuring peace and stability on the continent of Europe, where the 
EU and Russia are the biggest players, is one such priority for Europeans. 
Another is expanding and deepening trade while avoiding overdependence 
on Russian energy supplies. The EU could seek to exploit investment oppor-
tunities in Russia as they present themselves and as the Russian investment 
climate warms up. It could also focus on broadening 
and deepening humanitarian contacts between EU and 
Russian citizens. As Russia becomes more integrated into 
the global system, for example by joining the WTO and 
acceding to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in the future, Brussels and Moscow can 
work toward achieving greater harmony of their values, 
norms, and principles.
Even though outside powers do not have direct influence, more European 
engagement with Russians at all levels and in all fields—the economy and 
business, culture and the arts, tourism, and exchange programs—will sub-
stantially contribute to the transformation of Russian society, including values. 
Isolationist trends in the Kremlin’s policies can be effectively countered by 
opening Europe even more completely to ordinary Russian citizens. Moscow 
even advocates the goal of a visa-free regime between the Schengen zone and 
Russia. Phasing out visa restrictions is the most effective way for the EU to 
use its soft power—which will increase when Europe emerges from its present 
crisis and restarts growth—with respect to Russia. 
Thus, European diplomats need not be frustrated by the vicissitudes of 
Russian domestic developments. They should remain focused on a long-term 
strategic approach. Europe finds it difficult to be of one mind, or to speak 
with one voice, when it comes to Russia. It should seek, however, to ensure 
that its policy is not the lowest common denominator of national approaches. 
It should also avoid a situation in which Russia sees a relationship with the 
entire EU as laden with restrictions but views bilateral relationships with indi-
vidual EU member states as offering opportunities. 
Europe should not succumb to the new stereotype of Russia’s increas-
ing irrelevance in the twenty-first-century world and simply lose interest. 
Globalization has not entirely abolished geography. And if Moscow finds a 
way to emerge as a more important player, which is more likely, Brussels will 
have missed key opportunities for collaboration. 
as russia becomes more integrated into 
the global system, Brussels and Moscow 
can work toward achieving greater harmony 
of values, norms, and principles.
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Europeans would do well to pay close attention and use their soft power 
to build a special relationship with their biggest neighbor. Even though the 
EU’s relationship with Russia may become more contentious than it was in 
Medvedev’s supposedly halcyon days, enhanced understanding now will at 
least mean there will be less disillusionment in the future. 
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